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Abstract
UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous mobile networks allow a single mobile user with different radio technologies to
access different mobile networks, but how to secure such interworking networks and provide a seamless service is
a new challenge. Even if EAP-AKA protocol provides authentication services in UMTS-WLAN interworking networks,
a fast re-authentication of EAP-AKA protocol still cannot overcome high re-authentication delays and delay-
sensitive applications. Because a mobile user is authenticated by a remote RADIUS or a HLR/HSS both resided in
3G-UMTS home networks whatever a full authentication or a fast re-authentication is occurred. It causes that huge
re-authentication session loads and cryptographic operation loads concentrated on the RADIUS and the HLR/HSS.
In addition, such an inefficient authentication/re-authentication protocol also causes long authentication/re-
authentication latency. Therefore, this article proposes a novel protocol named fast iterative localized re-
authentication (FIL re-authentication) to replace the fast re-authentication of EAP-AKA protocol. The proposed
protocol not only has minor modifications to attain the same security level as EAP-AKA, but it uses both localized
re-authentication process and iterative process within the AP to handle the fast re-authentication locally and
iteratively for speeding up the re-authentication. Additionally, the IEEE 802.11 WLAN simulation mode based on
Network Simulator 2 is used for proving a valid implementation and for analyzing the performance of the
proposed protocol. It shows superior results in comparison to the existing EAP-AKA protocol.
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1. Introduction
Currently, the demands for broadband wireless access to
IP services between different wireless and mobile com-
munication networks are increased rapidly. IP backbone
constituted a core network for heterogeneous mobile
communication networks become the major goal in the
next generation wireless and mobile communication
networks. The heterogeneous mobile communication
network aims to provide seamless services for the
mobile user (MS) roaming across different mobile com-
munication networks. In various types of heterogeneous
mobile networks, 3G/UMTS-WLAN is one of main
representatives today. The general architecture of 3G/
UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous mobile networks is
depicted in Figure 1 [1-6]. As a result of different radio
access technologies, 3G/UMTS wireless cellular systems
provide high mobility with wide area coverage, but with
a low data transmission rate. On the other hand,
WLAN mobile communication systems offer high data
rates with low mobility over smaller areas.
Because the heterogeneous mobile communication
network requires a high reliability for access authentica-
tion, mobility managements, seamless handovers and
quality of service guarantee, access authentication espe-
cially. Thus, the integration and interoperability issues
of different authentication protocols become new chal-
lenges [2-13]. In 3G/UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous
mobile networks, 3GPP adopts the EAP-AKA protocol
proposed by Internet engineering task force (IETF) to
provide security and authentication services [14]. It pro-
vides a ‘challenge-response’ mutual authentication based
on AKA-based security mechanism between the Home
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Location Registry/Home Subscriber Server (HLR/HSS)
located in the 3G/UMTS Home Network (3GHN)
[1-3,13,14] and the WLAN MS. In addition, when
mutual authentication operation is completed, the HLR/
HSS delivers related authentication vectors (AVs) to the
RADIUS or authentication, authorization and account-
ing (AAA). Subsequently, an end-to-end secure session
between the the RADIUS and the UE can be established
to secure wireless links.
In general, EAP-AKA protocol invokes periodically
and frequently in 3G/UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous
mobile networks, while connection requests are
launched, while temporary connection services interrupt,
or as a result of intra-domain handovers and inter-
domain handovers. Once any condition is occurred,
EAP-AKA full authentication must be set up between
the HLR/HSS and the MS to secure wireless links. It
causes multiple rounds of message transactions traveling
between the 3G/UMTS domain and the WLAN domain.
As long as a number of full authentication sessions are
increased, a vast amount of messages are traveling
between the 3G/UMTS domain and the WLAN domain;
meanwhile, a huge amount of process loads are taken
place in the HAAA and in the HLR/HSS. Such draw-
back greatly influences authentication efficiency.
Furthermore, EAP-AKA adopts the fast re-authentica-
tion to support user re-authentication requests for pro-
viding better authentication efficiency than the full
authentication. Fast re-authentication is handled by the
HAAA/RADIUS server in the 3GHN when the MS
require re-authenticating. Although such procedures can
reduce unnecessary authentication-related transactions
between the HLR/HSS and the HAAA/RADIUS server
in the 3GHN, some drawbacks existed and need to be
overcome as follows: (1) a huge amount of re-authenti-
cation sessions are concentrated on the HAAA/RADIUS
server, (2) a huge amount of processing loads are con-
centrated on the HAAA/RADIUS server, and (3) both
re-authentication session loads and processing loads in
the HAAA/RADIUS server are increased due to a num-
ber of re-authentication request increases. Thus, authen-
tication efficiency improvement comparing with the full
authentication is limited [12,14].
In recent years, many articles proposed to solve
authentication and re-authentication latency problems
in 3G/UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous mobile communi-
cation networks. Pack et al. [15,16] and Mukherjee et al.
[17] proposed predicting user’s next move for pre-
authenticating UE with potential target AP (TAP). Pre-













































Figure 1 3G/UMTS-WLAN Heterogeneous Mobile Networks.
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operation because authentication or re-authentication
can take place in advance before it is needed to support
an association, rather than waiting for authentication
exchanges. Those schemes cannot predict where the
MH (mobile host) moves in the future, thus the pre-
authentication may be restricted to intra-domain opera-
tors, results in unnecessary authentication procedures
and increases signaling overheads in the WLAN domain
as a number of users increase. In addition, pro-active
key distribution mechanisms using neighbor graphs to
predict potential TAP are proposed by Arbaugh et al.
[18], Mishra et al. [19], Kassab et al. [20], and Hur et al.
[21]. Those schemes require additional authentication
server to pre-distribute pairwise master keys (PMK) dur-
ing a fast re-authentication session. In particular, the
increase in unnecessary keys pre-distribution process
becomes the primary drawback as a number of users
increase. Other drawbacks are similar to references
[15-17]. Other related schemes in references [22-26] are
used to minimize re-authentication delays without
retrieving AVs from the HLR/HSS and establish re-
authentication sessions in the WLAN domain. However,
those solutions must require major modifications the
original EAP-AKA, or 3G/UMTS-WLAN interworking
architectures or adopts other EAP-based authentication
protocols instead of EAP-AKA protocol.
To reform existent drawbacks of the fast re-authenti-
cation and to enhance re-authentication efficiency, this
article proposes a novel re-authentication protocol
named fast iterative localized re-authentication (FIL re-
authentication) to replace the fast re-authentication in
EAP-AKA. The localized re-authentication implement-
ing in 2G/GSM-WLAN heterogeneous mobile commu-
nication networks was first proposed by Lin et al
[27-30]. Based on the similar interworking considera-
tions and architectures to the 2G/GSM-WLAN hetero-
geneous communication networks, this article not only
extends the localized re-authentication concept to 3G/
UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous mobile communication
networks, but it adds authentication vectors distributor
(AVD) in the RADIUS server and local authentication
agent (LAA) in access points (APs) for handling both
the localized re-authentication process and the iterative
process. The AVD is designed to deliver AV resources
to related APs. The LAA is used to handle the localized
re-authentication process and the iterative process. The
objective of proposed authentication protocol in this
paper is to expedite authenticating mobile users by com-
pleting re-authentications locally and iteratively without
contacting the HAAA/RADIUS in 3GHN. Furthermore,
it also provides the same level of security and perfor-
mance by applying minor modifications to the existing
standard security protocols and architectures in 3G/
UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous mobile networks. Some
advantages of proposed authentication protocol are
summarizes as follows: (1) both re-authentication ses-
sion loads and computing process loads concentrated on
the RADIUS server are distributed to related APs, (2)
unnecessary Avs message transactions between the
3GHN domain and the WLAN domain are omitted, (3)
fast re-authentication sessions are executed locally and
iteratively between involved APs and involved MSs, and
(4) finally, the increased trend in authentication latency
is lightened when a number of re-authentication
requests increase.
Besides, this article also provides a proof of implemen-
tation based on Network Simulator 2 (NS-2) [31] with
the IEEE 802.11 WLAN mode, and the performance
evaluation in terms of authentication session time, band-
width cost, and authentication delay show superior
results in comparison to existing EAP-AKA protocol. In
following sections, the standard EAP-AKA protocol is
introduced. Section 3 describes the architecture and the
procedure of FIL re-authentication protocol. In Section
4, the numerical analysis and performance evaluation
are present. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 5.
2. Standard EAP-AKA protocol
EAP-AKA protocol adopted by 3GPP for the 3G/
UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous mobile networks could be
reorganized and shown in Figure 2[14]. The authentica-
tion may be a full authentication or a fast re-authentica-
tion depended on communication status and the
capability of the 3G/UMTS network and the MS. In
general, the fast re-authentication session must be
occurred after a completed full authentication session.
During the full authentication session, four network
entities are involved in operating security-related func-
tions included authentication (identity authentication
and HMAC authentication), AV generation, key genera-
tion, SQN-synchronization and encryption. On the
other hand, the fast re-authentication session does not
need to retrieve new AVs from the HLR/HSS, thus only
the HLR/HSS is not participated in operating five secur-
ity-related functions, authentication (identity authentica-
tion and HMAC authentication), AV and key
generation, counter-synchronization and encryption. As
comparing two authentications shown in Figure 2, it is
obviously that the fast re-authentication session has less
message roundtrips and reduces approximate 46%
authentication delays than the full authentication
[12,14]. Because the proposed FIL re-authentication pro-
tocol in this article is modified to the fast re-authentica-
tion in EAP-AKA protocol, only security-related
function aspects of the fast re-authentication are
explored in the following, and the other detailed aspects
of the full authentication can be referred to EAP-AKA
protocol, RFC 4187 [14].
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2.1. Identity authentication
Invoking an authentication at the beginning of a com-
munication session is inevitable. When completing a full
authentication, some authentication-related attributes,
such as master key (MK), K_encr, K_auth, and tempor-
ary fast re-authentication identity have already been
stored in the RADIUS server and in the MS, respec-






































Figure 2 Standard EAP-AKA protocol.
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must provide its temporary fast re-authentication iden-
tity used to support the privacy of subscriber permanent
identity to the RADIUS server. Then the RADIUS server
can recognize the identity as a legal UE by using the
network access identifier (NAI) mechanism [14].
2.2. AVs and keys generation
As receiving the legal fast re-authentication identity, AVs
and keys generation procedures must be activated in the
RADIUS server for generating new AVs included new
fast re-authentication identity, Nonce_S, and Counter_S
attributes. The new fast re-authentication identity is used
for the next fast re-authentication session and also used
to support the privacy of identity. The Nonce_S is a ran-
dom attribute for protecting replay attacks. The Coun-
ter_S is a sequence attribute for limiting the number of
successive re-authentication exchanges and for protecting
the RADIUS server and the MS from replays. Next, when
the RADIUS server has available AVs, key generation
procedures are launched immediately. First, old fast re-
authentication identity, Nonce_S, Counter_S, and MK
are used as seeds to generate new MK (XKEY) key calcu-
lated as XKEY = SHA-1 (fast re-authentication identity ||
Counter_S || Nonce_S || MK) where ‘||’ denotes a conca-
tenation operation. Then the XKEY is fed into the PRF
function to generate new key sets (K_auth and K_encr).
The overall attributes generated in this operation must
be saved back to the RADIUS server database. In addi-
tion, some attributes contained the fast re-authentication
identity, the Nonce_S and the Counter_S are protected
by the AES algorithm and forwarded to the intended MS
via the involved AP. As the MS receives available attri-
butes, then the same attributes (XKEY, K_auth, K_encr,
fast re-authentication identity) are acquired by using AVs
and Keys generation procedures as well in the RADIUS
server [14].
2.3. HMAC authentication
When completing the AV and Key generation operation,
the RADIUS server and the MS apply the HMAC-
SHA1-128 function to generate two message authentica-
tion codes, AT_MAC and AT_RES attributes, respec-
tively. Furthermore, both message authentication codes
are exchanged each other between the RADIUS server
and the MS for providing the support of mutual HMAC
authentication operations. In other words, the RADIUS
server provides the AT_MAC attribute to the UE for a
legal authorization. On the other hand, the MS also pro-
vides the AT_RES attribute to the RADIUS server for
proofing legal access [14].
2.4. Counter-synchronization
In EAP-AKA protocol, SQN-synchronization and coun-
ter-synchronization are involved in the full
authentication and in the fast re-authentication, respec-
tively. In SQN-synchronization, the primary attribute,
sequence number (SQN), is used to protect the HLR/
HSS and the MS from replays and to limit the number
of the full authentication sessions by mutual checking
the value of SQN attribute separately stored in the
HLR/HSS and in the MS. On the other hand, the domi-
nant attribute in the counter-synchronization is the
counter attribute. It is also used to generate desired key
sets, to protect the RADIUS server and the MS from
replays and to limit the number of successive re-authen-
tication sessions by mutual checking the value of coun-
ter attribute separately stored in the RADIUS server and
in the UE [14].
2.5. 802.11i encryption
This function is not specified in EAP-AKA protocol.
However, for supporting the link layer security of the
WLAN network, two encryption schemes are adopted in
EAP-AKA. One is the traditional wired equivalent priv-
acy (WEP) specified by IEEE 802.11 standards. However,
some known weaknesses and vulnerabilities are suffered
in the WEP today. As considering with higher level of
security, the Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) specified by
IEEE 802.11i is adopted by the EAP-AKA protocol.
When the RADIUS has successfully authenticated the
UE through the EAP-AKA mutual authentication proto-
col, they will share related keys, such as MK, MSK,
TEK, and EMSK. The MSK is designated as pairwise
mater key (PMK) and delivered to the APs. Then the
AP and MS using a four-way handshake and a two-way
handshake generate a pairwise transient key (PTK) and
a group transient key (GTK) to support IEEE 802.11i
encryption operation, respectively. Furthermore, IEEE
802.11i encryption operations include RC4 based
encryption temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) algo-
rithm for integrity protection and advanced encryption
standard (AES) algorithm counter mode CBC-MAC
protocol (CCMP) for the confidentiality.
3. Proposed FIL re-authentication protocol
Invoking a full authentication or a fast re-authentication
at the beginning of a communication session in EAP-
AKA protocol depends on the capabilities of the authen-
tication server and the MS and is inevitable. In addition,
the authentication service indeed is occurred periodi-
cally and frequently. Thus, minimizing authentication
delay can greatly improve interworking performance and
provide the support of seamless service in 3G/UMTS-
WLAN heterogeneous mobile communication networks.
Although fast re-authentication can enhance 46%
authentication efficiency than the full authentication by
neglecting unnecessary authentication-related transac-
tions between the HLR/HSS and the RADIUS [12,14],
Lin et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2011, 2011:124
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2011/1/124
Page 5 of 16
periodical fast re-authentication sessions are still
handled by the RADIUS resided in the 3GHN when the
MS requires a re-authentication. It is inefficient for sta-
tionary and mobile users to communicate with remote
authentication server in the 3GHN whenever re-authen-
tication is required. Meanwhile, a huge amount of re-
authentication message transactions between the 3G
domain and the WLAN might result in high authentica-
tion delays and might introduce unnecessary signaling
and processing overhead. Such delays directly affect
real-time applications and delay-sensitive applications
running in 3G/UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous mobile
communication networks. In addition, the impact of
authentication delays is increased with a number of fast
re-authentication session increases.
For improving re-authentication delays in 3G/UMTS-
WLAN heterogeneous mobile communication networks,
this paper proposed FIL re-authentication protocol that
is based on the EAP-AKA fast re-authentication and
also extends the concepts of FIL re-authentication in
GSM-WLAN heterogeneous mobile communication
networks [27-30] to 3G/UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous
mobile communication networks. Furthermore, the
AVD function in the RADIUS is responsible for the
execution of MS full authentication and for delivering
authentication-related messages to the LAA in the AP.
The LAA take over the RADIUS to enable the MS re-
authentication locally and iteratively. FIL re-authentica-
tion protocol model is depicted in Figure 3. In the fig-
ure, two major processes in the proposed model are
localized re-authentication process and iterative process.
In the full authentication, the AVD function is desig-
nated to distribute AV resources from the remote HLR/
HSS to intended APs. When the MS requests a re-
authentication access, the LAA can rederive new AVs
and key sets according to received AV resources stored
in the database of AP. Subsequently, the AP has suffi-
cient AVs for handling re-authentication sessions with
the intended MS locally. Such authentication operations
between the AP and the MS are called as localized re-
authentication process. The aim of localized re-authenti-
cation process is to decentralize re-authentication ses-
sion loads and processing loads in the RADIUS server
to APs. In addition, the iterative process is designed to
enable the execution of localized re-authentication pro-
cess iteratively and for completing re-authentications
locally without contacting the RADIUS. It also contains
iterative localized re-authentication and iterative AVs
generation. The localized re-authentication process and
iterative process are discussed in detail as follows.
3.1. FIL re-authentication protocol architecture
Figure 2 clearly shows that RADIUS server, AP and MS
are participating in the fast re-authentication session.
However, as comparing with Figure 4, the difference is
that the fast re-authentication is replaced by the FIL re-
authentication protocol performed between the AP and
the MS. In Figure 4, ① represents the localized re-
authentication process. ② and ③ represent iterative
localized re-authentication and iterative AVs generation,
respectively.
3.1.1. Localized re-authentication process
In order to explain how FIL re-authentication protocol
works, the localized re-authentication process must be
introduced first. The design objective of localized re-
authentication process is to expedite authenticating
mobile users by completing re-authentications locally
without contacting the RADIUS. Note that the first
round of FIL re-authentication must be activated after a
successful full authentication session, and some AVs
included temporal fast re-authentication identity (Fas-
t_ID), MK, K_auth, and K_encr have been delivering to
the AP’s database via the AVD function during a full
authentication. Fast_ID and MK attributes are used in
subsequent first round iterative AVs generation of the
iterative process that is introduced in the following
iterative process sub-section. K_auth and K_encr keys
not only are use to preserve integrity and confidentiality
of EAP messages during the full authentication session,
but those are responsible for preserving integrity and
confidentiality of EAP messages during this round loca-
lized re-authentication process, which is also called the
initial round of iterative process.
After a successful full authentication, when the MS
provides its temporal Fast_ID to request a re-authentica-
tion access, the FIL re-authentication protocol is
launched to trigger the localized re-authentication pro-
cess so-called the initial round of the iterative process.
The localized re-authentication process included some
security-related functions shown in Figure 4 is executed
between the AP and the MS. Upon receiving the tem-
poral Fast_ID, the LAA first runs the identity authenti-
cation to check whether the identity is legal or not. If
positive, then both the LAA and the UE runs the initial
round iterative AVs generation for re-deriving new AVs,
which are also stored back to its database, respectively.
The iterative AVs generation details in the iterative pro-
cess sub-section. By using the iterative AVs generation,
the AP and the MS can acquire available AVs and key
sets, which are used to enable the execution of the fol-
lowing security-related functions. Next, other security-
related functions can be performed between the AP and
the UE as well as the fast re-authentication. As the final
802.11i encryption function has been completed, it
represents that this round localized re-authentication
process has been finished. When the MS requests a re-
authentication access to the same AP again, the FIL re-
authentication protocol will be launched again to trigger
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new round iterative process introduced in detail as fol-
lows. According to the above mentioned, the database
of the AP not only needs to store pre-loaded AV
resources that are from the AVD function during an
ongoing full authentication, but it stores new AVs that
are re-derived by itself during an ongoing localized re-
authentication process.
3.1.2. Iterative process
In order to continue executing the localized re-authenti-
cation process between the AP and UEs without con-
tacting the RADIUS, the iterative process is proposed to
achieve this objective. In FIL re-authentication protocol
illustrated in Figure 4, the iterative process represents
two aspects. One is iterative localized re-authentication
(②) and other is iterative AVs generation (③). Mean-
while, the iterative AVs generation is one of functions
included in the iterative localized re-authentication.
3.1.2.1. Iterative localized re-authentication The pre-
vious section clearly shows one round localized re-
authentication, which also represents initial round of
iterative process. When the MS responses the Fast_ID(i
- 1) to request a re-authentication access again where
the index ‘i’ denotes the i-th iterative process, FIL re-
authentication is invoked again for activating new round
iterative process, which is so-called first round iterative
process. Here, Fast_ID(i - 1) was generated by the AP
during the previous iterative process. But in the first
round iterative process, Fast_ID(i - 1) was from the
RADIUS during the full authentication. Upon receiving
the identity, the LAA runs the identity authentication
function to check the identity and agrees running itera-
tive localized re-authentication with the MS. As com-
pleting the identity authentication of this round iterative
localized re-authentication, iterative AVs generation
function of this round iterative localized re-authentica-
tion is subsequently invoked for deriving new AVs. The
iterative AVs generation operation is shown in Figure 5
and details in the following section. The AP and the MS
can acquire available AVs and key sets by using such
iterative operations. Furthermore, those new derived
AVs are used for enabling the execution of the subse-
quent security-related functions of this round iterative
localized re-authentication between the AP and the MS.
When the operations of other security-related functions
perform as well as the localized re-authentication pro-
cess and have succeeded. It represents that both this
round iterative localized re-authentication and iterative
AVs generation have been finished. When the MS
requires a re-authentication access again, a new round
iterative process is triggered for invoking a new round
iterative localized re-authentication included a new
round iterative AVs generation again. Accordingly, if
any error has been occurred during any round iterative
localized re-authentication, the iterative process is termi-
nated immediately. Meanwhile, while the MS requests a














































Figure 3 FIL re-authentication protocol model.
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activated, rather than FIL re-authentication protocol.
Otherwise, the iterative process is keeping on going.
3.1.2.2. Iterative AVs generation The iterative AVs
generation establishes a secure AVs and key sets genera-
tion operation that results in generating fresh AVs and
keys to secure the communications between the AP and
the MS. Moreover, iterative localized re-authentication
is completed efficiently with minimum communications
between the MS and the AP. As the MS responses the
Fast_ID(i - 1) to requests a re-authentication access
again and demonstrates the temporal identity is valid,
FIL re-authentication protocol is trigger to invoke the
new round iterative process. Then the new round itera-
tive AVs generation shown in Figure 5 is also invoked
in the LAA. In Figure 5, the LAA first acquires Fast_ID
(i - 1) and MK(i - 1) attributes from the its database
and generates new Counter_A(i) and Nonce_A(i) attri-
butes where the index ‘i’ denotes the number of iterative
process. Second, for the user identity privacy in the next
round iterative process, the AP also generates new tem-
poral Fast_ID, denoted as Fast_ID(i). Then new mater
key denoted as MK(i) is derived as MK(i) = SHA - 1
(Fast_ID(i - 1) || Counter_A(i) || Nonce_A(i) || MK(i -
1)). Other new key sets included K_auth(i) and K_encr
(i) are also acquired by using the PRF according to MK
(i) key. Finally, new key sets (MK(i), K_auth(i) and
K_encr(i)), Fast_ID(i), Counter_A(i), and Nonce_A(i)
attributes need to store back to the AP’s database for
supporting the execution of following security-related
functions of this round iterative localized re-authentica-
tion and the next round iterative process. When com-
pleting above operation, it represents that one round
iterative AVs generation operation has been accom-
plished. Subsequently, other security-related functions
can be executed between the AP and the MS in order
during this round iterative localized re-authentication.
In the final 802.11i encryption function, new re-derived
key sets results in generating fresh PTK and GTK by
using a four-way handshake and a two-way handshake
to support IEEE 802.11i encryption operation. As the
802.11i encryption function has been completed, it
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Figure 4 FIL re-authentication protocol architecture.
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has been finished. When the next round iterative pro-
cess is invoked, the next round iterative AVs generation
is also invoked.
3.2. FIL re-authentication protocol procedure
In this section, the sequence procedures of FIL re-
authentication protocol are presented in detail. Since
FIL re-authentication protocol is proposed to replace
the fast re-authentication in EAP-AKA, it must be
invoked after a successful full authentication session
while the MS requires a re-authentication with the
related APs again. The sequences are illustrated in Fig-
ure 6 and detail as follows.
3.2.1. STEP ⓪: initial state
Upon completing a full authentication, available AVs
included temporal Fast_ID(i - 1), MK(i - 1), K_auth(i -
1), and K_encr(i - 1) have been stored in the AP and in
the MS, respectively. It is so-called the initial state of
the FIL re-authentication protocol. In the first round
FIL re-authentication case, the related AVs are denoted
as Fast_ID(0), MK(0), K_auth(0) and K_encr(0), respec-
tively. Here, those AVs are generated by the RADIUS
during an ongoing full authentication session.
3.2.2. STEP ①: identity authentication
When the MS sends an EAPOL-start message to request
a FIL re-connection access, the AP immediately sends
EAP request/identity message to the MS for running the
identity authentication. Then the UE must response the
Fast_ID(i - 1) to demonstrate the temporal identity is
valid. Upon receiving the temporal identity, the AP first
runs the identity authentication to check whether the
received identity is valid. If the identity check is positive,
the AP agrees on using the first round iterative localized
re-authentication and also invokes the first round itera-
tive AVs generation function.
3.2.3. STEP ②: iterative AVs generation (AP)
The symbol (AP) represents that the function operation
is handled by the AP. In this function, the LAA first
generates Counter_A(i) and Nonce_A(i) attributes. Then
two attributes with MK(i - 1) and Fast_ID(i - 1) are
used as the seeds to generate fresh key sets (MK(i),
K_encr(i), K_auth(i)) by the iterative AVs generation
operation shown in the Figure 5. Secondly, in order to
implement the later HMAC authentication function,
two message authentication code attributes (AT_MAC(i)
and AT_XRES(i)) must be calculated, respectively. The
AT_MAC(i) attribute is calculated as AT_MAC(i) =
HMAC-SHA1-128 (K_auth(i - 1) || Nonce_A(i) || EAP
message). The AT_XRES(i) attribute is calculated as
AT_XRES(i) = HMAC-SHA1-128 (K_auth(i) || Non-
ce_A(i) || EAP message). Furthermore, for supporting
the user identity privacy, the new temporal Fast_ID(i)
must be generated randomly and is also used in the
identity authentication and iterative AVs generation of
the next round iterative localized re-authentication.
Meanwhile, the temporal Fast_ID(i) is protected by an
AES algorithm with K_auth(i) key and the encrypted
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Figure 5 Iterative AVs generation operation.
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Nonce_A(i) and Counter_A(i) must be encrypted by
using an AES algorithm with K_auth(i - 1) key to pre-
vent from masquerading and compromising. Those
encrypted attributes are denoted as *AT_Nonce_A(i)
and *AT_Counter_A(i), respectively. Once completing
the preceding security-related parameters generation,
new AVs need to stored back to its database. Then the
AP immediately sends the EAP-request/AKA/FIL re-
(5) Counter-Synchronization procedures
5-3.EAP-Request/AKA/Client-error/Notification
(Notification code for terminating the FIL Re-authentication  







A Successful Full Authentication Session/A Successful FIL Re-authentication Session
3. EAP-Request/AKA/FIL Re-authentication
$7B0$&L$7B,9L$7B&RXQWHUB$L$7B1RQFHB$L$7B(QFUB'DWDL
(1)Decrypt *AT_Nonce_A(i) and *AT_Counter_A(i) 
with K_encr(i-1) key to acquire the Nonce_A(i) and 
Counter_A(i) attributes
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(4) Calculate 
(6) Calculate *AT_Encr_Data(i),*AT_Nonce_A(i), 
and *AT_ Counter_A(i)
(5) Generate next Fast_ID(i)
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(2) Calculate MK(i), K_auth(i), and K_encr(i)
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(Notification code for terminating the FIL Re-authentication









(6)Calculate *AT_Encr_Data(i) = 
AES(AT_IV(i),K_encr(i),Counter_A(i))
(2)Check
(1)Decrypt *AT_Encr_Data(i) with K_encr(i) 




(Initiate a new conventional 
full authentication)
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(Notification code for terminating the FIL Re-authentication exchanges
and initiating a new conventional full authentication) 7-2-1. EAP-AKA Success
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Figure 6 The sequence of FIL re-authentication protocol.
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authentication message including AT_MAC(i), AT_IV(i),
*AT_Counter_A(i), *AT_Nonce_A(i), and *AT_Encr_-
Data(i) to the MS.
3.2.4. STEP ②: iterative AVs generation (UE)
Upon receiving the EAP-request message, the MS first
decrypts *AT_Counter_A(i) and *AT_Nonce_A(i) with
K_auth(i - 1) key to acquire Nonce_A(i) and Counter_A
(i) attributes. Then the MS performs the iterative AVs
generation operations as well as in the AP to re-derive
fresh key sets (MK(i), K_encr(i), K_auth(i)) and message
authentication codes (AT_XMAC(i) and AT_RES(i)).
3.2.5. STEP ③-④: HMAC authentication and counter-
synchronization (UE)
When completing iterative AVs generation and message
authentication code operations, then the MS runs the
HMAC authentication function to verify the calculated
AT_XMAC(i) with the received AT_MAC(i) to confirm
whether the AP is legal. If invalid, the MS responses an
EAP-response/AKA/client-error message to the AP for
terminating FIL re-authentication exchanges and for
asking a new full authentication. Otherwise, the coun-
ter-synchronization function has continued performing.
In the counter-synchronization function, the MS checks
the value of the received Counter_A(i) to make sure
that the number of the FIL re-authentication has not
exceeded the assigned limit. The detailed counter syn-
chronization procedures in the FIL re-authentication are
as well as the fast re-authentication in the EAP-AKA
[14]. In addition, in order to prevent the Counter_A(i)
attribute from masquerading and compromising, it must
be encrypted by an AES algorithm with K_encr(i) key
and the encrypted attribute is denoted as *AT_Encr_-
Data(i). If both HMAC authentication and counter-syn-
chronization checks are valid, the UE replies the EAP-
response message included *AT_Encr_Data(i), AT_IV(i),
and AT_RES(i) to the AP.
3.2.6. STEP ③-④: HMAC authentication and counter-
synchronization (AP)
As receiving the EAP-response message from the MS,
the AP first decrypts the *AT_Encr_Data(i) with K_encr
(i) key to acquire the Counter_A(i) attribute. Then it,
respectively, runs the HMAC authentication function
and counter-synchronization function to verify the
received AT_RES(i) and Counter_A(i) with the
AT_XRES(i) and Counter_A(i) that are stored in its
database. If both checks are positive, the AP sends an
EAP success message to the MS. Otherwise, the AP
immediately announces an authentication failure mes-
sage to the RADIUS serve for requesting a new full
authentication. Meanwhile, it also sends a client-error
notification to the MS for terminating the FIL re-
authentication exchanges and for initiating a new full
authentication.
3.2.7. STEP ⑤: 802.11i encryption
Upon receiving the EAP success message from the AP,
the MS can decrypt the received *AT_Encr_Data(i) with
K_auth(i) key to acquire new temporal Fast_ID(i). Then
Fast_ID(i) and new derived AVs are stored back to the
its database. Next, the AP and the MS get into the
ciphering mode. When the final encryption function is
completed, it represents one round iterative localized re-
authentication has been finished.
3.2.8. STEP ⑥: iterative localized re-authentication
The steps from ① to ⑤ are represented one round
iterative localized re-authentication. While the MS
requests a FIL re-connection again, the FIL re-authenti-
cation protocol will be activated again for triggering the
next round iterative localized re-authentication.
The preceding procedures clearly show that the FIL
re-authentication enables the execution of the re-
authentication session between the AP and the MS
locally and iteratively. It expedites authenticating mobile
users by using the localized re-authentication process
and the iterative process. The localized re-authentication
process is designated to the support of the local re-
authentication, which results in distributing re-authenti-
cation session loads and processing loads. The iterative
process is designated to enable the execution of loca-
lized re-authentication process iterative, which contri-
butes to complete re-authentications iteratively without
contact the RADIUS. Based on those advantages, the re-
authentication efficiency can be obviously improved as
comparing the FIL re-authentication with the standard
fast re-authentication and the standard full authentica-
tion, respectively. For validating the re-authentication
efficiency in the FIL re-authentication, the numerical
analysis and performance evaluations about the authen-
tication session time, bandwidth cost, and authentication
delays are given in the following section.
4. Numerical analysis and performance evaluation
In this section, the performance of the FIL re-authenti-
cation protocol are evaluated and are compared with
the standard full authentication and the standard fast
re-authentication in EAP-AKA protocol in terms of
authentication session time, bandwidth cost, and
authentication delay. In actual, it is difficult to measure
authentication performance accurately since the real sys-
tem performance depends on a variety of factors, such
as security tunnel, bandwidth limitation, device comput-
ing capability, network topology, and entity location.
Thus, for providing a proof implementation, some fac-
tors in our simulation model are neglected and are
assumed in Table 1. In addition, the simulation model is
based on the NS-2 with extensions for the IEEE 802.11
model [31] and is written in C++ and Otcl languages.
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4.1. Authentication session time
In the initial state of the simulation model, 100 APs and
a number of MSs from 100 to 1000 are placed together
onto a rectangular grid (4 km2). The location of MSs is
evenly distributed in the different AP’s coverage. More-
over, all MSs simultaneously move with fixed velocity
(V), the MS may moves 2ra distance to crossover differ-
ent AP service area in the worst case. Based on such
assumptions, the authentication request rate in the
RADIUS server denoted as RAR_RADIUS can be derived as
follows:
RAR RADIUS =
n* user authentication request
T
=




n ∗ √N ∗ V
2rr
. (1)
In addition, there are only one HLR/HSS and one
RADIUS server resided in the proposed simulation
model. Thus, the authentication request rate in the
HLR/HSS RAR_HLR/HSS is approximated to the RAR_RA-
DIUS. Also, the authentication request rate of the single
AP is expressed as follows:
RAR AP =
n*user authentication request
N ∗ T =
n ∗ V ∗ T
2ra






Based on preceding derived formulas and simulation
model assumptions, the actual simulation results in
authentication request rate in different network entity
are summarized in Table 2. It clearly shows that the
increase trend in the authentication request rate is pro-
portional to the MS increases. In addition, since most
authentication requests are concentrated in RADIUS
and HLR/HSS, the authentication request rate in the
RADIUS or HLR/HSS is much large than in the single
AP. In fact, the simulation results indeed show that cen-
tralized authentication requests not only made a great
impact on the authentication session loads and proces-
sing loads in the RADIUS and HLR/HSS, but these
loads affect authentication efficiency running on the 3G/
UMTS-WLAN interworking networks.
Next, in order to verify the impacts on the authentica-
tion session time, the authentication request rate in
Table 2 must be taken into account in the authentica-
tion session time simulation. The simulation results
about the authentication session time in different
authentication protocols are illustrated in Figure 7. In
the figure, the average authentication session time in the
conventional full authentication and in the conventional
fast re-authentication is 96.457 and 50.145 (ms), respec-
tively. As a result of the reduction in authentication-
related message transactions between the HLR/HSS and
the RADIUS, since the fast re-authentication can lower
about 48.1% authentication session time comparing to
the conventional full authentication. On the other hand,
the authentication session time in the FIL re-authentica-
tion protocol is 15.575 (ms). As comparing the FIL re-
authentication protocol with two conventional authenti-
cation protocols, the reduction of authentication session
time in the full authentication and in the fast re-authen-
tication reaches up to 83.9 and 69%, respectively. There-
fore, it clearly shows that the FIL re-authentication
indeed improves authentication performance and pro-
vides better authentication efficiency than two conven-
tional authentication protocols.
4.2. Bandwidth cost
To validate the best performance in bandwidth con-
sumption of the FIL re-authentication, first all transac-
tion message size between different network entity
sections in one round authentication session are calcu-
lated and summarized in Table 3. Next, as referring to
previous simulation model, the simulation results in
bandwidth cost are illustrated in Figure 8.
Figure 8a illustrates the curves of bandwidth cost
between the AP and the UE in different authentications.
The curve of the fast re-authentication is approximately
equal to the curve in the FIL re-authentication; more-
over, as a result of extra counter and nonce attribute
transactions in the HMAC authentication and counter
Table 1 Simulation parameter
Simulation parameter Value
MAC protocol 802.11
Simulation area 4 (km2)
Number of HLR/HSS 1
Number of RADIUS server 1
Number of local APs (N) 100
Number of UEs (n) 100-1000
Service radius of RADIUS service (rr) 1 (km)
Service radius of single AP (ra) 0.1 (km)
Local AP placement Grid
UEs placement Uniform
Average speed of UE (V) 10 (km/h)
Direction of UE movement [0, 2π]
Simulation time (T) 1800 (s)









100 2.218 2.226 0.0247
300 4.207 4.213 0.0438
500 8.019 8.093 0.0818
700 10.442 10.876 0.1131
900 13.175 13.202 0.1397
1000 14.227 14.436 0.1483
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synchronization functions, thus both curves of band-
width cost are increased approximately 14% than in the
full authentication.
In Figure 8b, the curves of conventional full authenti-
cation and conventional fast re-authentication will
change as mobile users increase. It is a significant
increasing trend as a result of centralized authentication
sessions result in a huge pile of messages traveling
between the RADIUS server and APs. In addition, the
localized re-authentication process and iterative process
in the FIL re-authentication protocol are designated to
decentralize re-authentication sessions from the
RADIUS server to APs and to omit unnecessary authen-
tication-related transactions between the RADIUS and
the AP. Thus, the bandwidth cost between the RADIUS
and the AP in the FIL re-authentication lowers approxi-
mately 94 and 89% than in the full authentication and
in the fast re-authentication, respectively. This impact
also reflects on the curve raised smooth comparing with
two conventional authentication protocol curves.
In Figure 8c, the increased trend of the curve implies
that authentication-related tansactions between the
HLR/HSS and the RADIUS are only occurred in the full
authentication. The increased trend is proportional to
the UE increases. Such unnecessary authentication-
related transactions can be neglected by using the fast
re-authentication and the FIL re-authentication. Thus,
the overall bandwidth cost in different authentication
protocols can be depicted in Figure 8d. The figure
clearly shows that the FIL re-authentication approxi-
mately lowers 53 and 48% bandwidth cost than that in
the full authentication and in the fast re-authentication,
respectively. To bandwidth consumption point of view,
FIL re-authentication indeed has the best bandwidth
consumption performance than other authentication
protocols.
4.3. Authentication delay
To the authentication performance point of view,
authentication delay is a major critical factor. It is also
constituted of three delay elements, such as processing
delay (DProc), transmission delay (DT), and propagation
delay (DProp). Thus, the DAuth can be expressed as fol-
lows:
DAuth = Dproc +DT +Dprop (3)
The processing delay is the delay experience by each
node while processing cryptographic operations and key
generation accounts for most of the processing delay. It
Figure 7 Authentication session time.
Table 3 Total message size between different network entity
Authentication type Between UE-AP Between AP-RADIUS Between RADIUS-HLR/HSS Total
Full authentication 245 Bytes 240 Bytes 124 Bytes 609 Bytes
Fast re-authentication 285 Bytes 280 Bytes 0 Bytes 565 Bytes
FIL re-authentication 285 Bytes 4 Bytes 0 Bytes 289 Bytes
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mainly depends on the processing capability held by
each node. To simplify the simulation model, the factor
of processing capability among different network entities
is neglected, and each processing operation is unified a
basic value, 0.01 (ms). Thus, it can be easy compre-
hended that the processing delay of different authentica-
tions is depended on the number of processing
operations of each network entity.
The transmission delay is the delay experience while
transmitting an EAP message. It usually varies with
some factors, such as transmission bandwidth and trans-
mission protocols. Some researches discussed that it is
insignificant compared the processing delay with the
propagation delay [11,12,25,27-30]. Based on such
assumptions, the transmission delay is not taken into
account in the simulation model without affecting esti-
mating the authentication delay in different authentica-
tion protocols.
The propagation delay is one-direction propagation
delay between different network entity sections. The
propagation delay of EAP-AKA protocol is constituted
of three propagation sections in the simulation model.
One is the propagation delay between the UE and the
AP, another is between the AP and the RADIUS and
the other is between the RADIUS and the HLR/HSS.
For simplifying the estimation model, the value of one-
direction propagation delay is designated as an identical
value. Thus, it can be easy expressed that the propaga-
tion delay of different authentication protocols is
depended on the number of propagation sections in dif-
ferent authentication protocols. Such assumption does
not affect overall authentication efficiency comparisons
in our simulation model [11,12,25,27-30].
Based on the above assumptions, the authentication
delay in different authentication protocols is expressed
in Table 4. According to the authentication delay
expression in Table 4 FIL re-authentication has the low-
est propagation delays than other conventional authenti-
cation protocols. However, both the FIL re-

Figure 8 Bandwidth cost between different network entity. (a) Bandwidth cost between the AP and the UE. (b) Bandwidth cost between
the RADIUS and the AP. (c) Bandwidth cost between the RADIUS and the HLR/HSS. (d) Total bandwidth cost.
Table 4 Authentication delay expression
Authentication type Authentication delay (DAuth)
Full authentication protocol 12 * DProp + 16 * DProc
Fast re-authentication protocol 9 * DProp + 21 * DProc
FIL re-authentication protocol 6 * DProp + 21 * DProc
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authentication and the fast re-authentication have the
higher processing delays than the conventional full
authentication. Next, the processing delay is set to a
unified value, 0.01 (ms). The propagation delay is desig-
nated a value, which is varies from 0.2 to 2 (ms) and the
sampling interval is set to 0.1 (ms). Then the simulation
results about authentication delay in different authenti-
cation protocols are depicted in Figure 9. In the figure,
the FIL re-authentication significantly lowers 47 and
30% authentication delay time than in the full authenti-
cation and in the fast re-authentication, respectively.
Furthermore, the impact of the authentication delay is
proportional to the propagation delays, which is
depended on the number of authentication message
transactions. Alternatively, the simulation results also
give one proof that FIL re-authentication has the best
authentication performance than other authentication
protocols.
5. Conclusion
In EAP-AKA protocol, the fast re-authentication has the
better authentication performance than the full authen-
tication. However, the re-authentication efficiency of the
fast re-authentication is still limited since the execution
of re-authentication is handled by the authentication
server resided in 3GHN. In this article, FIL re-authenti-
cation protocol is proposed to replace the fast re-
authentication in EAP-AKA protocol. It can be summar-
ized some advantages as follows: (1) it provides the same
level of security and performance by applying minor
modifications to the existing standard security protocols
and architectures in 3G/UMTS-WLAN heterogeneous
mobile networks, (2) it is to expedite authenticating
mobile users by completing re-authentications locally
without contacting the HAAA/RADIUS in 3GHN, and
(3) localized re-authentication sessions are executed
between the AP and the MS iteratively without contact-
ing the RADIUS server in the WLAN domain. In addi-
tion, the simulation results show that FIL re-
authentication has the best performance comparing to
other conventional authentication protocols in terms of
authentication session time, bandwidth cost, and
authentication delay.
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